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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
CITY OF ST. GEORGE,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
]i

vs.

Case No. 900175-CA

STEVEN D. MABEY,
Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 78-2a-3 (2) (d) , 1953 as amended, and
Rule 3(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This appeal followed a final judgment of the Fifth Circuit
Court of Utah, Washington County, St. George Department, Criminal
Case. No. 892004212, finding the Defendant guilty of failing to
yield the right-of-way in violation of Sec. 41-6-73 of the St.
George City Code, an infraction.

At the trial before the Court

on February 22, 1990, the Court denied the Defendant's Motion for
Continuance.

The Court entered its judgment finding the
1

Defendant guilty and imposed a fine against the Defendant of
$45.00, which fine was paid by the Defendant on February 22,
1990.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1.

Whether the Court abused its discretion in denying the

Defendant's motion for a continuance of the trial made at the
commencement of the trial, where a prior continuance had been
granted

and where the Defendant failed to show that he had

exercised due diligence in obtaining witnesses in his favor.
2.

Whether the evidence presented at trial is sufficient to

support the trial court's judgment finding the Defendant guilty
of violating Sec. 41-6-73, St. George City Code.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Sec. 41-6-73, St. George City Code, as adopted, stating:
"The operator of a vehicle intending to turn to the left
shall yield the right-of-way to any vehicle approaching from the
opposite direction which is so close to the turning vehicle as to
constitute an immediate hazard."

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Plaintiff disputes the statements of fact set forth by
the Defendant in that such facts are not supported by, but indeed
are contradicted by, the record in this case.

The material

facts, as supported by the record herein, are as follows:
2

On November 1, 1989, a collision occurred between vehicles
driven by the Defendant and Ms. Gretchen Goulding.
occurred

The collision

at the intersection of Brigham Rd. and Pioneer Rd.

within the limits of the City of St. George, Utah. (Trans, p.7,
1.7-15;

p.8, 1.16-21).

When

the collision

occurred, the

Defendant was traveling west on Brigham Rd. and Ms. Goulding was
traveling east on Brigham Rd. (Trans, p.8, 1.22-24; p.9, 1.4-6).
The Defendant, upon reaching the intersection of Brigham Rd. and
Pioneer Rd. made a left-hand turn into the path of the vehicle
driven by Ms. Goulding and the collision occurred. (Trans, p. 9,
1.7-11;

p.18,

1.2-5).

An

investigation

of

the

collision

indicated that the Defendant was at fault for failing to yield
the right-of-way to Ms. Goulding's vehicle.

(Trans, p.9, 1.19-

24) .
There

is no

indication that Ms. Goulding ever saw the

Defendant signal his turn. (Trans, p.17, 1.25 through p.18, 1.1;
p.23, 1.24-25).

Contrary to the Defendant's statements in his

brief, Ms. Goulding was not in a hurry at the time of the
collision

(Trans, p.21, 1.16-18, 22-25);

and there was no

evidence that either vehicle was traveling at an excessive or
illegal speed at the time of the collision. (Trans, p.9, 1.1218;

p.18, 1.6-7;

p.22, 1.10-12;

p.41, 1.1-2).

3

p.31, 1.5-6;

p.40, 1.23-25;

Ms. Goulding's vehicle was approximately one car length from
the Defendant's vehicle when she realized the Defendant was
turning in front of her.

Ms. Goulding applied her brakes but was

unable to stop her vehicle before colliding with the Defendant's
vehicle. (Trans, p.28, 1.11-15;

p.18, 1.12-16;

p.28, 1.19-24).

The Defendant's main contention to the trial court was that
he was first to enter the intersection (Trans, p.31, 1.15-16) and
Ms. Goulding had ample time to stop her vehicle in order to let
the Defendant complete his left turn through the intersection
(Trans, p.33, 1.20-22; p.34, 1.6-12, 1.22-25;

p.38, 1.22-24;

p.39, 1.2-5).
At

the

commencement

of the trial in this matter, the

Defendant sought a continuance of the trial to allow him more
time to locate alleged witnesses and to obtain counsel (Trans,
p.3, 1.23 through p.4, 1.5;

p.5, 1.8-18).

The court denied the

continuance as the trial had already been continued once and the
Defendant had failed to show due diligence in preparing his case
for trial or in his efforts to obtain counsel (Trans, p.6, 1.1525) .
Based upon the evidence presented, the trial court found the
Defendant guilty of failing to yield the right-of-way and this
appeal followed (Trans, p.41, 1.11-12).

4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Whether a request for continuance should be granted lies in
the sound discretion of the trial court.

As the Defendant failed

to show due diligence or sufficient cause for the continuance,
the trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying the
motion for continuance made by the Defendant at the commencement
of the trial.
The Defendant claims that the other driver, Ms. Goulding,
should be found guilty of violating the City traffic code and
that the Defendant should be found not guilty of failing to yield
the right-of-way to Ms. Goulding.

The Defendant's arguments are

based upon an erroneous interpretation of law which he claims
would give him the right-of-way in making a left-hand turn simply
by virtue of his having entered the intersection first and his
perception

that Ms. Goulding could have stopped

before colliding with the Defendant's vehicle.

her vehicle

There is ample

evidence upon which the trial court could find that the Defendant
violated the provisions of St. George City Code Sec. 41-6-73,
making him guilty of failing to yield the right-of-way to Ms.
Goulding's vehicle.

5

ARGUMENT
A.

The Trial Court Properly Denied the Defendants Motion
for Continuance Made at the Commencement of Trial,

At the commencement of trial, the Defendant requested that
the trial be continued to allow him to find additional witnesses
and to obtain counsel.

On appeal, the Defendant asserts that two

of his main witnesses were not available at trial but would have
proved his case.

Thus, the Defendant implies that the trial

court's denial of the motion for a continuance was erroneous.
"When a defendant in a criminal action moves for a
continuance in order to procure the testimony of an
absent witness, such a defendant must show that the
testimony sought is material and admissible, that
the witness could be produced within a reasonable
time, and that due diligence has been exercised
before the request for a continuance."
State v. Creviston, 646 P. 2d 750, 752 (Utah 1982)

(denial of

continuance affirmed where defendant stated only that testimony
was

"vital," content of prospective witnesses' testimony was

speculative or likely to be inadmissible, no showing made that
witness could be produced in a reasonable time and defendant did
not

exercise

availability
continuance).

due
of

diligence

witnesses7

in

ascertaining

testimony

or

in

the

value

moving

for

or
a

See also State v. Humpherys, 707 P.2d 109, 110

(Utah 1985) (motion to continue trial denied where two of three
witnesses were available at trial and need for third witness was
speculative at best).

6

In support of his motion for continuance, the Defendant
asserted that he had been trying to locate witnesses to the
accident and had recently done so (Trans, p. 3, 1.2 3 through p. 5,
1.7) .
However, as in Creviston, the Defendant here failed to meet
the requirements for a continuance as set forth above.

The

Defendant proffered no indication as to when the proposed
witnesses

might be available, or what the content of their

testimony might be.

Additionally, no explanation was made as to

why such witnesses could not have otherwise been located during
the approximately four months between the collision and the trial
of this matter.
The trial court specifically found that there was no showing
that the Defendant had exercised due diligence and thus, denied
the Defendant's motion to continue the trial.
"It is well established in Utah . . . that the granting of a
continuance

is at the discretion of the trial

judge, whose

decision will not be reversed . . . absent a clear abuse of that
discretion." State v. Humpherys, 707 P. 2d at 109;

State v.

Creviston, 646 P.2d at 752. In doing so, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying the continuance and such denial
should be upheld.

7

B.

The Judgment of the Trial Court is Supported by the
Evidence Presented at Trial and Should be Affirmed,

The Defendant asserts on appeal that the trial court's
judgment should be reversed and Ms, Goulding, the driver of the
other vehicle involved in the collision, should be found "guilty
of speeding and other charges." Defendant's brief at p,2.

It is

evident from the Defendant's arguments that his appeal is based
upon his disagreement with the trial court's evaluation of the
evidence presented at trial and his misunderstanding of the law
under which he was found guilty.
Based upon the facts presented, the trial court found that
the Defendant failed to yield the right-of-way to Ms. Goulding's
vehicle (Trans, p.40, 1.8-10).

In reviewing the trial court's

judgment, "the function of this Court 'is not to determine guilt
or innocence, the weight to give conflicting evidence, the
credibility of witnesses, or the weight to be given defendant's
testimony.'"
Rather,

State v. Goriick. 605 P.2d 761, 762 (Utah 1979).

in cases such as this where the sufficiency of the

evidence is challenged, this Court will:
review the evidence and all inferences which may be
reasonably drawn from it in the light most favorable
to the verdict. State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443
(Utah 1983). "When there is any evidence including
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it,
from which findings of all the requisite elements of
the crime can be reasonably made, [the Court's]
inquiry stops, and [the Court] sustain[s] the verdict."
State v. Gehrinq. 694 P.2d 599, 600 (Utah 1984).

8

State v. Udell. 728 P.2d 131, 132 (Utah 1986).

The Court will

not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact, State
v.

Sparks, 672 P.2d

92, 93

(Utah 1983), overruled on other

grounds, State v. Ossana, 739 P.2d 628, 631 (Utah 1987), and the
verdict will not be overturned unless there is a clear showing of
lack of evidence or that the evidence is so inconclusive or
inherently improbable that reasonable minds could not reasonably
believe the Defendant had committed a crime.
735 P.2d 410, 412

(Utah Ct. App. 1987).

State v. Gabaldon,
See also State v.

Bergwerff, 777 P.2d 510, 511 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Reviewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom

in the

light most favorable to the trial

courts

judgment against the Defendant adequately establishes that all
the requisite elements of the offense of which the Defendant was
charged were met.

Sec. 41-6-73, as adopted by Sec. 12-1-1988 of

the St. George City Code, required that the Defendant yield the
right-of-way to Ms. Goulding prior to making his left turn.
The trial court, as the trier of fact, weighed the evidence and
testimony presented to it and found the Defendant guilty of
failing to yield the right-of-way as required.

At trial Ms.

Goulding testified the Defendant failed to yield the right-of-way
and turned in front of her without her having a chance to avoid
the

collision

by

stopping.

The investigating

officer

also

testified that the Defendant had failed to yield the right-of-way
9

to Ms, Goulding7s vehicle.

The fact that the collision occurred

evidences that Ms. Goulding's vehicle was close enough to the
Defendant's vehicle to constitute an immediate hazard to the
turning vehicle.

Indeed, the Defendant's own arguments at trial,

and here on appeal, support the trial court's judgment.
The

Defendant

argues

that

Ms.

Goulding

saw

that

the

Defendant was making a left turn and "did not slow down or
respect that I was already in my turn when she saw me in the car.
The law requires that she should slow down to let me make my turn
since I was in the intersection first and my turn signal was on
in advance of the turn and she saw the signal."
brief at p. 2.

Defendant's

The traffic code provides that the Defendant, as

the driver of the turning vehicle, must yield the right-of-way to
oncoming traffic.

The Defendant's argument that Ms. Goulding saw

his vehicle and had time to stop, and should have stopped to let
him complete his turn through the intersection, only serves to
further evidence that the Defendant violated the cited statute by
failing to yield the right-of-way.

The fact that the Defendant

was first into the intersection and that Ms. Goulding may have
had

time to

irrelevant.

stop prior

to colliding with the Defendant

is

If Ms. Goulding was required to stop, or even slow,

her vehicle in order to avoid a collision with the Defendant, the
Defendant is guilty of violating the provisions of Sec. 41-6-73.
The evidence presented certainly supports such a finding.
10

CONCLUSION
The Defendant carries the burden on appeal of showing that
the trial court was in error.
(Utah 1985);

State v. Noren, 704 P.2d 568, 571

State v. Jones, 657 P.2d 1263, 1267 (Utah 1982).

This the Defendant has failed to do.

The trial court properly

denied the Defendant's motion to continue the trial based upon
the Defendant's lack of due diligence in preparing his case.

The

trial court, as the trier of fact, also weighed the testimony and
evidence presented at trial and found a clear-cut case against
the Defendant.

The judgment entered against the Defendant by the

trial court is amply supported by the record herein.

Thus, the

Plaintiff

affirm

respectfully

requests

that

this

Court

the

judgment entered by the trial court against the Defendant.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / / S

day of May, 1990.

Attorney for City of St. George

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correctpopies
of the above and foregoing Brief of Respondent, this //^t£ day
of May, 1990, to Steven D. Mabey, 1021 So. Valley View Drive, St.
George, Utah 84770.

Gar^G./iCuhlm
:x>ey for City of St. George
Attorney
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IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH
CITY OF ST. GEORGE,
I

Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT

vs.
STEVEN D MABEY
1021 So. Valley View Dr. #147 ,
St. George, Utah 84770

Case No. 892004212

Defendant.

The above matter having come on for trial before the Court
on February 22, 1990, pursuant to notice sent to Defendant, the
Plaintiff City of St, George appeared through its attorney, T. W.
Shumway, and the Defendant appeared in person without counsel.
The Defendant moved for a continuance in order to obtain the
attendance of witnesses not present, but the Court denied the
motion as the Defendant was aware of the trial date and had
already had sufficient opportunity to prepare for trial;
there

had

Defendant.
the

been

a

previous

continuance

at

the

request

also
of

The court proceeded to try the matter, and based upon

witnesses

and

evidence

Defendant guilty as charged.

presented,

the

court

found

the

The Defendant was sentenced to pay

a fine of $36.00 on the charge of failure to yield (Sec. 41-6-73,
St. George City Code as adopted), an infraction,, together with a

State Fee of $9.00, for a total of $45.00 due and payable as of
this date,
DONE IN OPEN COURT this 22nd day of February, 1990.

Circuit Court Judge

Ongnia&H
i

2

FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH

3

WASHINGTON COUNTY, S T . GEORGE DEPARTMENT

4
5

* * * * *

6

Plaintiff,

7

vs .

a

STEVEN MABEY,

9

TRIAL

CITY OF ST. GEORGE,

Case No. 892004212

Defendant.

TO

* *

11

BE IT REMEMBERED, that on the 22nd day of

12

February, 1990, the above-entitled matter came on for

13

hearing before the Honorable Robert F. Owens, Judge

14

of the above-named Court, at the Washington County Hali

15

of Justice, St. George, Utah, and that the following

16

proceedings were had:

17

IB
19
20

APPEARANCES;
Theodore W. Shumway,
St. George City Attorney

For the Plaintiff:

21

The Defendant appeared pro se.
22
23
24
25

BYRON RAY CHRISTIANSEN. JR.
C E R T I F I E D SHORTHAND R E P O R T E R

1

THE COURT:
failure to yield.

The next case is Steven D. Mabey,

And the record may show the defendant is

present and, let's see, Officer Stratton, let's see if
the Information needs to be signed.

Go ahead and be seated,

Mr. Mabey.
Do you solemnly swear the allegations of the Information
you just signed and testimony you're about to give in the
case before the Court will be the truth, the whole truth,
and nothing but the truth so help you God?
MARLON STRATTON:
THE COURT:

Yes, I do.

All right, you may take the stand.

Mr. Shumway, you'll be handling this case, is that
correct?
MR. SHUMWAY:
STEVEN MABEY:
cont —

Yes, your Honor.
Uh, your Honor?

Can I request a

I want to request on the record a continuance.

Can

I do that now?
THE COURT:

You can make that motion, yes.

STEVEN MABEY:

Do I make it right now?

THE COURT: Yes.
STEVEN MABEY:

Okay.

I wanted to make a motion

for a continuance of this trial for two basic reasons:
The first reason is, is that I have been trying, since
BYRON

RAY

CHRISTIANSEN.

JR.

C E R T I F I E D SHORTHAND REPORTER
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the time of the accident, to locate one of about —

anywhere

from about six to eight people that were out front of the
video store and out front of the convenience store during
that time.

And for various reasons, the people haven't

seemed to be very cooperative.

One person volunteered that

she knew people, her name is Jennifer Harrison.
at the convenience store at Bloomington.

She worked

And then she

went away for vacation, came back, then she said that she
could not locate the people because she did not know their
names.

She only knew them by their face.

I said to try to keep going —

And therefore,

to look for these people,

because she did know them, and she did know of at least
two people that she knew of.

And she saw the accident also.

She couldn't come this morning because she had a test
at school.
And then as of Sunday, this last Sunday, just a few
days ago, I had been repeatedly, discreetly, trying to
follow up to see if she had —
store*

if the people had come to the

And she said the one girl usually came in for drinks,

had not been in.

And then the girl came in, I'm not sure

exactly when, but Saturday or so, before this last Sunday,
which is only a few days ago, and she got her name.
So only at about 6:30 on Saturday night, just a few
days ago, I got the name of the witness, talked to the witness and she referred me to two other people, they knew one
B Y R O N RAY C H R I S T I A N S E N . J R .
CKRTirico SHORTHAND REPORTER
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more, and I have not been able to track down the other
person that knew the majority of the information-

And I

was not able to get these people in this short of time to
come to court, or subpoena them.

And that's the first

reason that I would like to ask for a continuance, because
the major part of the evidence to prove my case, I cannot
do without these witnesses.
And the second part of the reason is that I tried to
obtain a lawyer to help me with this matter, because I
felt that there was enough complication for me on my part
that I wanted to get a lawyer to do it.

And I finally got

ahold of Mr, Clayton Huntsman who agreed to look at it
about a week and a half ago, and then he got a severe case
of the flu, put me off for several days, finally said he
couldn't do it, referred me over to Mr. Alan Boyack.
couldn't do it in the time period necessary.

He

So therefore,

I haven't been able to retain legal counsel, and both of
those persons are willing to file their story with the Court,
So for the two reasons that my main evidence that I
want to present before the Court to prove my case, because
the witnesses are not available

because of the short time

and only came available a few days ago, not due to my fault;
and secondly, I have not been able to retain a lawyer.
Those are the two main reasons why I would like to
ask for a continuance.
BYRON

RAY

CHRISTIANSEN.

JR.

CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER
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THE COURT:

What is the position of the City

with respect to the motion for a continuance?
MR. SHUMWAY:

If your Honor please, this is a case

that occurred back in November.

It did involve an accident.

We would be opposed to any further delay.
been continued once before.

I understand it's

There's been no showing or

evidence that the witnesses that the defendant refers to
would contribute or support a defense that he might raise.
There's more than adequate time to contact —

locate an

attorney, and I don't believe that any of the reasons he's
given for not having an attorney would be justified on the
grounds of dilligence, nor has there been a showing the
witnesses would be material or helpful to his defense.
Therefore, we would oppose the continuance.
THE COURT: We normally hear traffic cases within
30 to 6 0 days from the time of the incident.

There was

a previous continuance granted, and now, on this case, we're
going on four months, so it's a very old case.
There's been no showing of due dilligence, that is,
last-minute preparations or attempts to get attorneys are
never grounds for a continuance without a showing that
for some reason it was impossible to do so in a timely
manner.
So, for those reasons, the motion for a continuance is
denied.
BYRON

RAY

CHRISTIANSEN.

JR.

C E R T I F I E D SHORTHAND R K P O R T C *
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You may proceed, Mr. Shumway.
DIRECT EXAMINATION,
BY MR. SHUMWAY:
Q.

Please state your name and occupation.

A.

My name is Marlon Stratton.

I'm employed as a

police officer for the City of St. George.
Q.

Officer Stratton, were you so employed back on

the 1st day of November of 1989?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Calling your attention to approximately 4 p.m.

in the afternoon of that date, did you have occasion to be
in the area of Brigham Road and Pioneer Road or were you
called there?
A.

Yes.

I was called to the scene of an accident

at the intersection of Brigham Road and Pioneer Road.
Q.

Is that intersection the one immediately west of

the Bloomington exit of the freeway?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

Just before you reach the small commercial center

there?
A.

Right.

Right on the corner by the Bloomington

Market.
Q.

Is that intersection controlled by any traffic

control of any type?
A.

Yes, it is.
BYRON

RAY

CHRISTIANSEN,

JR.

CcftTiFiiD SHORTHAND RKPORTKR
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Q.

Would you describe that for us?

A.

Yes, it's a four-way intersection.

There is a

stop sign on Pioneer Road, which would run north and south.
Q.

So traffic on the north-south, Pioneer Road,

have to stop for east-west traffic on Brigham Road, is that
correct?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

All right.

What time was it when you arrived

there?
A.

I arrived at the scene at 4:11 p.m.

Q.

And were you able to ascertain approximately when

the accident occurred?
A.

I was dispatched at 4:08 p.m., so I was there three

minutes after the accident occurred.
Q.

All right.

A.

Upon my arrival, I found two vehicles within the

intersection.
Goulding.

Tell us what you found when you arrivedf

The first vehicle was driven by Gretchen

That vehicle was a 1979 Chevrolet Camaro, gold

in color.
The second vehicle, driven by the defendant, Mr. Mabey,
was a 1989 Eagle Medallion, which was blue in color.
Upon my investigation, I determined that the vehicle
driven by Gretchen Goulding, the Camaro, had been traveling
eastbound on Brigham Road.

She had apparently just left

work, which is at Dixie REA, the building directly behind the
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Bloomington Market.

She had pulled out of the parking lot

there, turned right, and proceeded east on Brigham Road,
As she was approaching the intersection of Brigham
Road and Pioneer Road, the defendant, Mr. Mabey, driving the
American —

or the Eagle Medallion, had been traveling west-

bound on Brigham Road approaching Gretchen Goulding.
From talking to both of the drivers, I determined
that the driver, the defendant, Mr. Mabey, made a lefthand turn from Brigham Road to turn onto Pioneer Road.
At that time he turned into the path of Miss Goulding, in
which a collision occurred.
QL

All right, did you have any evidence of excessive

speed on the part of Mrs. Goulding?
A.

No. There was no evidence, whatsoever.

no skid marks at the scene.

There were

I talked to Gretchen about that,

she indicated she had just barely left the driveway and
the defendant, Mr. Mabey, turned so quickly in front of
her that she had no time to brake at all.
Qi

Do you have an opinion as to whether there was

adequate time for Mr. Mabey to make a safe left turn at
the time he did so?
A.

My opinion was that he did not have time to make

a safe left-hand turn, that he did not yield the right-ofway to Miss Goulding.
QL

And based on that, did you cite Mr. Mabey?
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A.

Yes. I was going from west towards the east.

Q.

Go ahead.

A.

I was heading to go under the freeway to turn left

to go onto the freeway to come into St. George.
was one car that was in front of his car.
in the same direction that he was turning.

And there

It turned left
It went through

the intersection before I had reached the intersection.
Q.

In other words, another car going west turned

south onto Pioneer Road before you reached the intersection?
A.

Yes.

Q.

All right.

A.

Yes, I did see him behind.

Q.

How far behind was he?

A.

Urn —

Q.

Car lengths

—

A.

Maybe two —

about two car lengths.

Q.

All right.

Did you see him behind that car?

As he came into the intersection,

where were you?
A.

As he came into the intersection, I was just

starting to go through the intersection.
Q.

You were coming into it also?

A.

Uh-huh (affirmative) , yes,

Q.

Did you in any way signal for a turn?

A.

No.

Q.

Did he signal for a turn?
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A.

I can't remember whether he signaled or not.

Q.

Tell us what he did,

A.

Okay,

He just tried to turn left in front of me

and to get -chrough the intersection before I got through
the intersection.
Q.

How fast were you going?

A.

Fifteen to twenty miles an hour, 20 at the most.

Q,

Could you estimate his speed?

A.

I'd say that his speed was probably going a little

bit faster to get through the intersection before I got
through the intersection.
Q.

All right. When you observed him turn in —

in

front of you, were you able to stop?
A.

When he started going through the intersection,

I could see that we were going to hit, so I just slammed
on my brakes.
Q.

When you observed him starting to turn, how far

away was his car from your car?
A.

As his was turning left?

Qi

Yes.

A.

It was probably from here to about where he's

seated at the desk.
Q.

All right.

So there's no way you could avoid

the accident?
A.

No.
B Y R O N RAY C H R I S T I A N S E N . JR.
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drawing on the board, where —

how —

which —

when you

came on the highway that day, which parking lot did you
come from?
A.

How far down the road were you?
It may have been 75 to 100 yards from that inter-

section.
STEVEN MABEY:

Your Honor, this, again, is important

in my case on speed and what she saw.

If she could draw

just one little mini drawing as to where she came out, how
far down the road, approximately.
MR. SHUMWAY:

I?ll object to that.

If your

Honor please, she's testified 75 to 100 yards.
THE COURT: Sustained.
Q.

(By Mr. Steven Mabey) Okay.

Let me ask you this:

That day, you were leaving work?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay.

A.

I wasn't in a hurry.

Were you in a hurry that day?
I had an appointment that I

was heading to.
Qi

Okay.

What kind of an appointment?

Was it a~

medical appointment or an urgent appointment of some kind?
A.

It was a medical appointment.

Q.

Medical appointment.

So you were in a hurry, then,

to make that appointment?
A.

No.

I wasn't in a hurry.

I had time to get to the

appointment.
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Q.

What time was your appointment?

A.

It was 4:30.

Q.

Just one more question on the appointment.

How

far did you have to go to make that appointment at 4:30
from the time of the accident?

Was it downtown St, George

or —
A,

Yes, it was at the hospital.

Q.

Okay.

All right.

Did you —

in the 75 to 100

feet, when you started out of the parking lot, normally
how fast would you go up that street?

What would — what

was your speed that day?
A.

It was about 15 to 20 miles.

Q.

Okay. And were you drinking anything that day,

Vodka or beer or anything?
A.

No.

I had been working from 8 till 4 when I

had just gotten off work.
Q.

Were you taking any medication, pain pills or

drugs of any kind for any sickness or illness or anything?
A.

No.

Q.

No drugs. Okay.

came out of that 75 feet —

When was the first time as you
you mentioned you saw a few

other cars —
A.
Q.

Seventy-five yards, excuse me.
.Seventy-five yards.

Okay.

When you came out of

that 75 yards, where was the first time in yards, was it 10
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yards a fter you turned out?

When was the first time that

you saw my car?
A.

i

Let's see, I seen a car in front of your car first.:

I was probably, um, yardwise, it was before the first
entrance to the video shop.
ft

That you saw me, then?

A.

Uh-huh (affirmative).

ft

So how many yards from where you see my car on

the boa rd to where the first time that you saw me — would
you estimate how many yards were you from the first time
you saw me to where we hit?
A.

Twenty-five yards —

ft

And that was —

A.

Twenty-five.

ft

Twenty-five yards. Was that the first time that

you saw me?
A.

Yes, uh-huh.

ft

Okay.

A.

I had seen your car after —

right behind the car

that was in front of you*
&

A.

And what did you think that I was trying to do?
To turn left through the intersection before I

j got to the intersection.
1

ft
A,

And did you see my turn signal?
I don't remember if I had seen it or not.
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THE COURT:

Well, Mr. Mabey, you have to stop at

some point and give the witness a chance to answer the
question,
STEVEN MABEY:
0.

All right,

(By Mr. Steven Mabey)

All right, when did you

know that I was going to —
THE COURT:

All right.

You've already asked it.

Let her answer now.
THE WITNESS:

When you started into the intersec-

tion.
Q.

(By Mr. Steven Mabey)

Okay.

Then how many yards

was that when you knew I was going to turn into the intersection?
A.

My car may have been one car length back from where

he has my car drawn now.
Q.

At this

back here?

Okay.

So at that time, did

you push on your brakes at that point?
A.

When you were turning through the intersection?

Q.

Yeah, when you knew that I was turning, did you

push on your brakes to stop for me or did you just keep
going?
A.

I started to put on my brakes just before we —

when I could see that you were not going to get through the
intersection and we were going to hit, I put on my brakes.
Q.

So how many yards was it, or in feet, when you
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thousand miles per month, normally, so I'm used to driving.
So the main point is, is that I felt that I was clear,
I looked all ways and I felt in my normal timing that no
one would hit me at that time.
I would have been going probably about 15 to 20 miles
an hour.

The gold car of Gretchen Goulding, in my opinion,

what I believed happened is that she was speeding and did
not judge my distance that day.

I believe the speed would

have been 30 to 40 plus miles an hour, probably in a hurry
that day.
And the next point is, is I believe she did not make
an attempt to try to stop for me or slow down for me.

As

she stated in her testimony, she thought she had the
right-of-way.
I believe that —

well, number one, that I was first

in the intersection.
Now, I want to show a couple of things on the board
here about the accident.

Well, first thing I want to show —-

how far does this microphone pick up?
THE COURT:
talk in the —

Well, it will pick up if you would

talk loud like you're doing now.

STEVEN MABEY:

Okay.

On the board there's two

things I'm going to show, which are very important, concern
the skid marks and concern the point of the hit on my car,
are the two points that I want to show on the car and where
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the point of the front bumper of the pointed front of the
Camaro car hit me.

So therefore, the drawing is incorrect.

My car would have been pointing straight, almost —

it would

have maybe had a very, very slight angle, but it was almost
going straight into the road, which is Pioneer Road.
Thirdly, my car was not in the middle of the intersectio n
as described.
or —

It was a little bit farther down, a few feet,

well, probably a little more like the front line Ifm

showing right here.
So, the two points that I'm making, are the fact that
I had already made my turn, so I was already well into my
turn and she had plenty of visual view that day to see my
car into the full turn.

And I would maintain that she would

have known from the distance from that exit to the time that
I was in that road, I believe she would have had at least
15 to 20-plus yards that she would have known that my car

—

because when I made my turn, I was making a turn towards
going this direction, so there would have been an angle
of turn that she would have known I wasn't going to go
straight.

And I believe that it would have been 15 to 20

yards back that she would have saw me.

So she had more

than ample time to stop.
The other point that I would like to put in my defense,
your Honor, is the fact that the officer said on the court
record that there were no skid marks, absolutely no skid
BYRON RAY CHRISTIANSEN. JR.
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1

marks of any kind when he checked the accident, which is

2

a very major point

3

and it pushed her .into

4

her if she hit the brakes hard, she said she hi"b the brakes

5
6
7

Because she s,tated she hit her brakes
— she hit the brakes hard.

I asked

; hard.
Your Honor, there were no
I point, anywhere in here.

So

— no skid marks at that

what

I maintain, your Honor,

8

is that she had pi enty of time to know that I was turning,

9

she probably could have stopped at least one to two car

10

lengths, at least one to two car lengths before she could

n

have hit me as a normal driver would have in the — even

12

in the most normal courtesy.

13

So, I maintain, your Honor, that she was in a hurry

14

that day, the Chrysler investigator maintains that it

15

would have been a fairly hard impact, 30 or 40 miles an

16

hour.

17

car, so therefore, she did not try to stop.

18

It's a very deep gash, directly in the side of my

There were no skid marks.

I maintain she was speeding,

19

she was in a hurry to be downtown and there was a long

2d

distance she had to drive in a few minutes that day, your

21

Honor.

22

And I think that's just about it. "So I maintain

23

that I was being courteous, I was first in the intersection,

24
25

I was far into my turn, she had ample time to stop, did not
stop, did not try to stop, was speeding.
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;

matter that's just been asked.
STEVEN MABEY:
THE COURT:

Oh, okay, just been asked.

You can't rehash the other.

STEVEN MABEY:

Let's see. No, I don't have

any more questions.
THE COURT:

All right.

Both sides have rested,

then, does either side wish to present closing argument,
first, Mr. Shumway?
MR. SHUMWAY:
THE COURT:

And Mr. Mabey?

STEVEN MABEY:
THE COURT:

We'll waive opening argument.

What did you want me to do now?

Well, at the end of the case, each

side has the right to present a summation or closing argument
I realize you've done that substantially in your testimony,
but I'm giving you that final right, if you wish to do so.
STEVEN MABEY:

Yeah, I do just want to say a couple

of words here, because this is important to me.

It has

nothing to do with the girl involved, but again, the —

the

officer clearly, in a phone call I had to the officer, and
from the paperwork and the testimony here in the trial today,
did not measure the accident, did not find any skid marks.
There was no rubber of any kind.

Therefore, it is my belief

that the girl, Gretchen Goulding, did not make any —
absolutely did not make any attempt to try to stop.
I believe that she was just in a hurry that day, her
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speed picked up in speed, because she thought she may have
been cleared and had the right-of-way, and it ! s my belief
that I was to the intersection —
tion.

I was well into my turn.

in -- first to the intersec
She had more than ample

time, two or three car lengths, to come to a slow stop.
There absolutely should have been no collision of any kind
and I believe that I made the necessary turn signals and
followed all the law that I should have followed in the
accident.
I was clear of all my faculties that day, no drugs,
no drinking, I had been to that intersection over 100
times with no problem before, any time going through that
intersection and that intersection, because there1s no
light and it's such a big intersection, I usually watch
quite carefully when I go through that intersection, as
to who's coming and going in that intersection.
THE COURT:

Any rebuttal?

MR. SHUMWAY:

I would just say, your Honor, that

the evidence does not indicate an excessive speed on the
part of either vehicle.

There would have been cars spinning

around and ending up over on the side of the road and that
sort of thing.
The testimony is that there was no evidence of speed,
except some unclear evidence from the defendant.
There is no reason why Mr. Mabey should not have yielded
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the right-of-way, why he should be in the lane of car going
straight ahead with no evidence of turning, why he should
not have waited until she had safely cleared the intersection before he made his turn.
The evidence is quite clear, in my opinion, that he has
failed to yield the right-of-way to a car that had the rightof-way, and he should be found guilty.
THE COURT:

All right.

Well, the matter having

been submitted, it does appear to the Court a clear-cut
case under the facts and the law. The oncoming traffic
on that street very clearly have the right-of-way, and
what right-of-way means is the right to continue undisturbed,
not having to put on the brakes or take any evasive action.
A person turning in front does not obtain a right-ofway to turn simply by either reaching the intersection first
or starting to turn first.

That person has the obligation

to not, at any point, create an obstacle for the oncoming
traffic.
The fact that the accident occurred is presumptive
evidence that you, Mr. Mabey, did not yield the right-ofway •
Now, the only thing that forfeits right-of-way is
unlawful driving behavior by the oncoming traffic.
speeding has been alleged.

In this

It does not appear to me from

the accident, itself, and other circumstances and from the
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direct testimony of the other driver that there was excessive speed by either car.
I would assume that the accident occurred because of
failure to distracts —

distract the attention or something

of that nature on your part, but not excessive speed on the
part of the oncoming traffic.

Even if there had been,

your testimony would have indicated that you either were
or should have been aware of it, and therefore, it would not
have been unexpected for you.

And if that's true, then

that would not constitute a defense.
So I find you guilty under the facts of failure to
yield right-of-way.
Let's see, you failed to appear, apparently, within
10 days.

What was the reason for that?
STEVEN MABEY:

severe laceration.

I was confined to my home with a

I got 50 stitches across my head, I was

taking medicine that day and could not get up here.

I

called the Court and told them that I had to have an extension on the case.

I could not get here to the Court.

THE COURT:

Well, we show the call, but the

call came about a month and a half later.

How long were

you confined to your home?
STEVEN MABEY:

Well, it wouldn't have been a month

and a half later, because I did place the call that wasn't
too long after that point in time.
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